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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the effects of firm-specific and country-specific characteristics, and the 1997 
Asian financial crisis on the debt maturity structure of firms in the Asia Pacific region. Given that the 
economies of the sample countries were at different stages of development and were affected by the 
1997 Asian financial crisis by different degrees, the paper explores the effects of the crisis on debt 
maturity structure by grouping the sample countries according to the severity of the crisis.  The results 
indicate that firms adjust their debt maturity structure to target level very quickly; the maturity 
structure decision of a firm is the product of both its own characteristics and the economic and 
institutional environment in which it operates.  They also reveal that the crisis had significant effects 
on firm’s debt maturity structure and their determinants.  
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1. Introduction 
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) and subsequent works of Kraus (1973) and 
Stiglitz (1974) suggest that debt maturity choice is irrelevant in efficient capital markets. However, 
Morris (1976) shows that even under similar restrictive assumptions, short-term debt can reduce 
shareholder’s risk if there is uncertainty of future interest rates, since investors cannot easily diversify 
away inter-temporal risk. Consequently, debt maturity can affect firm’s value. Subsequent theoretical 
literature on the role of debt maturity structure on firm value offers arguments in support of several 
hypotheses, from tax (Brick and Ravid, 1985 and 1991; Lewis, 1990) and liquidity risk hypotheses 
(Diamond, 1991), to moral hazard (Myers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1980; Hart and Moore, 1995) and 
signalling hypotheses (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991 and 1993).  
A host of empirical studies have assessed the validity of these hypotheses. The first generation 
of empirical evidence emerged as a by-product of the investigation of the determinants of corporate 
capital structure. More recent and direct empirical evidence on corporate debt maturity structure 
focuses mainly on firms operating in major developed markets (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Scherr and 
Hulburt, 2001).1 On the strength of both theoretical and empirical results, it is now established that the 
choice of corporate debt maturity is one of the most important financing decisions, since an 
inappropriate choice can lead to inefficient liquidation. The difference in the cost of short- and long-
term debt can also lead to variations in the determinants of optimal debt maturity choice and in firm’s 
value, because of different incentive characteristics.  Finally, an optimal decision of debt maturity mix 
can help to alleviate the agency problem.  
Despite the wealth of literature, both the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence on 
the debt maturity decision of firms are mixed. Studies have identified the effects of firm-specific 
variables on debt maturity structure, but little is known about whether, to what extent and how the 
observed differences in corporate governance and institutional environment may affect the debt 
maturity choice of firms.2 In addition, most studies analyse the experience of firms under ‘normal’ 
market conditions, but little is understood about how firms make their financial decisions when market 
conditions are far from ‘normal’. This paper aims to further address these issues and contribute to two 
new and important dimensions of the literature. Firstly, it investigates the potential effects of economic 
conditions, corporate governance and institutional set-up on the debt maturity structure of firms in 
both emerging and more developed economies in the Pacific Basin region. Secondly, it provides the 
first evidence on the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the determinants of corporate debt 
                                                
1
 An exception to this is Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who analyse the choice of debt maturity 
structure in 30 countries, and show that there are many similarities in the determinants of firms’  debt maturity 
choice across developed and developing markets. 
2
 Exceptions include Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Fan et al. (2004) and Antoniou et al. (2006). 
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maturity choice of firms operating in the region. An improved understanding of these issues should 
help both financial markets and companies to identify the sources of financial risk, and how to manage 
it, in different and changing economic and institutional conditions. 
The selection of the four sample countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, 
is based on three important considerations. First, the 1997 Asian crisis affected the chosen countries 
by different degrees. While the crisis started in Thailand and Malaysia and deeply affected these 
countries, Singapore averted the worse effects and recovered quickly.  Australia, although in the same 
region, was untouched by the crisis. Therefore, an investigation of the effects of the crisis on the 
corporate debt maturity structure of these nations offers a comprehensive picture of how different 
degrees of variation in macroeconomic conditions may affect firm level’ s decisions. Second, firms in 
these countries operate under different legal, corporate governance and economic settings, and thus the 
effects of these different environments can be directly addressed.3 Third, this study extends the current 
international evidence on corporate financial decisions in general and the sparse literature on the 
experience of firms from this region in particular.4 
To achieve the above objectives the paper investigates: (i) firm-specific and country-specific 
determinants of corporate debt maturity structure in the Asia Pacific region; (ii) whether, and how, the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 affected the corporate debt maturity choice of firms; and (iii) whether 
the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure are different across countries at different stages 
of economic and financial development.  
 
2. Economic and Institutional Environment 
Different economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional environments influence 
the relationship between managers, shareholders and creditors, as well as investors’  behaviour. This 
may offer some explanations for the different patterns on financing behaviour observed across 
countries and regions. The indicators of economic and legal environment in the sample countries 
summarised in table 1 show that there are variations across countries, such as higher corruption levels 
and lower presence of information intermediaries in the less developed relative to the more developed 
countries in the sample. There are also variations in the size of banking and capital markets in relation 
to the country’ s GDP, and in the level of legal protection of creditors and shareholders. Finally, the 
                                                
3
 For instance, in the two more developed markets in the sample, i.e. Singapore and Australia, publicly issued 
financial instruments are an important source of external finance, while the two emerging markets, i.e. Thailand 
and Malaysia, are characterized by greater reliance on banks and other financial intermediaries to provide most 
of the external funds to business.  
4
 See Deesomsak et al. (2004) for a study of the determinants of capital structure for firms in the same sample 
countries and for references to other empirical investigations in this region.   
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ownership structure of firms in this region tends to be highly concentrated leading to higher agency 
cost of debt.5 It is expected that this disparity in corporate governance and institutional environment 
would affect the relevance of the different potential determinants of debt maturity structure, and 
contribute to explaining variations across sample countries.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Firm’ s financing decisions may also be affected by unforeseeable economic events, such as the 
Asian financial crisis of July 1997. The effects of this crisis on individual countries varied 
considerably and showed the vulnerability of the less developed economies in the region. The crisis 
originated in Thailand and Malaysia and quickly spread throughout the region. Singapore successfully 
averted the worst effects of the crisis and recovered quickly (Cha and Oh, 2000; Chowdhry and Goyal, 
2000), while evidence suggests that Australia was not really affected (Grenville, 1999). This is not 
surprising, because Australia had deeper and more mature financial markets as a consequence of the 
financial deregulation of the 1980s, and was not subject to the fatal combination of large volatile 
capital flows and fragile domestic financial sector that characterised many East Asian countries. 
The evidence suggests that in the period preceding the Asian crisis asymmetric information 
problems worsened, and the deterioration of balance sheets eventually led to the crisis (Mishkin, 
1999). Financial markets were no longer able to allocate funds efficiently.  Firms became more 
concerned about their debt exposure and creditors more stringent on their lending. According to 
Chowdhry and Goyal (2000) the crisis was mainly caused by moral hazard problems and a self-
fulfilling run on liquidity, due to the maturity and liquidity mismatch between deposits and loans. In a 
highly uncertain and volatile environment, financial analysts’  opinions became paramount to financing 
decision-making, and this may have partly contributed to the different impact of the crisis across the 
affected countries. The 1997 Asian crisis emphasised the importance of a carefully chosen maturity-
mix of debt to firms and their lenders. It also highlighted the inefficiency of the corporate governance, 
legal and institutional environment in this region, and the consequences of unsound lending decisions 
and lack of transparency. It is therefore reasonable to expect that this economy-wide event may have 
had a significant impact on the debt maturity decision of firms. 
 
3. Corporate Debt Maturity and Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Corporate Debt Maturity Hypotheses 
The main hypotheses identified by the literature on debt maturity structure include: moral 
hazard, taxation, signalling, and liquidity risk.6  The moral hazard hypothesis emphasizes the role of 
                                                
5
 See Deesomsak et al. (2004) for a more detailed discussion of corporate governance and institutional 
environments in the same sample countries compared to the US and UK. 
6
 See Ravid (1996) for an extensive survey of the theoretical studies on corporate debt maturity structure. 
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short-term debt in reducing agency problems, such as under-investment and asset substitution. Myers 
(1977) and Barnea et al. (1980) suggest that firms can control the under-investment problem by 
shortening the effective maturity of their debt, since when short-term debt matures before growth 
options are exercised there is an opportunity for firms to re-contract and for debt to be re-priced, so 
that gains from new investment do not accrue to debtholders. In addition, Barnea et al. (1980) propose 
that short-term debt can mitigate the adverse risk incentives of debt financing, or the asset substitution 
problem, because short-term debt is less sensitive to risk shifting. Thus, short-term debt reduces 
shareholders’  incentives to engage in high-risk projects. Within the tax hypothesis framework, Brick 
and Ravid (1985) and Lewis (1990) propose an irrelevance theorem and identify the conditions under 
which taxation can affect debt maturity. Kane et al. (1985) establish that the net benefit of tax, after 
allowing for the cost of bankruptcy, tends to be very small and thus not sufficient to offset the 
amortized transaction or floatation costs. In this context, firms should lengthen debt maturity only if 
the tax advantage is higher than the amortized floatation costs. 
The signalling and the liquidity risk hypotheses were developed by Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991). When there is asymmetric information between lenders and firms, and in particular 
managers have better or timelier information about firm’ s value than investors, the nature of 
equilibrium is determined by transaction or floatation costs. The market cannot distinguish between 
good and bad quality firms and a separating equilibrium ensues. Flannery (1986) argues that firms 
with the private information that they are relatively high quality prefer short-term debt to avoid paying 
a market premium on long-term debt that is too high for their quality, since it reflects the average 
probability of default. On the contrary, those with the private information that they are low quality 
prefer long-term debt, because the market premium on long-term debt reflects a probability of default 
that is lower than their own. Thus, the prediction is that debt maturity is inversely related to firm’ s 
quality. Similarly, Diamond (1991) assumes that firms have private information about their credit 
quality, but a firm will also consider its liquidity risk, defined as the risk of being unable to repay 
debts because of the deterioration in financial or economic conditions. It is thus suggested that firms 
trade off the benefits of short-term debt in improving credit quality rating against their liquidity risk.  
 
3.2. Firm-Specific Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 
One of the most significant differences across empirical studies on debt maturity is the 
formulation of the dependent variable, i.e. the measurement of debt maturity. Most studies consider 
some form of debt ratio, but they differ in whether book or market values are used, and also in the 
definition of long-term debt. In general, previous empirical studies have followed two alternative 
approaches: (i) the incremental approach, which uses the maturity of bond issuance to proxy debt 
maturity (Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Esho et al., 2002); or (ii) the balance-sheet 
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approach,  which uses either the percentage of a firm’ s total debt that matures after a certain period 
(Barclay and Smith, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Barclay et al., 2003; Antoniou et 
al., 2006), or the weighted-average maturity of a firm’ s liability (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Scherr and 
Hulburt, 2001). This paper follows the balance-sheet approach and defines debt maturity (MAT) as the 
proportion of long-term debt to total debt, where long-term debt includes debt of more than one-year 
maturity.7  
Based on the hypotheses discussed in the previous section, the firm-specific explanatory 
variables investigated in the paper include leverage, firm size, growth opportunities, earnings 
volatility, liquidity, profitability, share price performance, asset maturity and firm’ s quality. Table 2, 
Panel A, summarizes the relationship postulated by different theories between firm-specific variables 
and debt maturity, and specifies the proxy measures used. The liquidity risk hypothesis predicts that a 
firm lengthens its debt maturity as leverage (LEV) increases in order to offset the higher probability of 
a liquidity crisis, and thus delay exposure to bankruptcy risk (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Therefore, 
leverage is expected to be positively correlated with debt maturity. On the other hand, Myers (1977) 
suggests that the agency cost of under-investment can be mitigated by reducing leverage, or by 
shortening debt maturity. If firms reduce debt to mitigate the under-investment problem, there is less 
need to shorten their debt maturity. Therefore, the moral hazard hypothesis predicts a negative 
relationship between leverage and debt maturity. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 Both the moral hazard and the signalling hypotheses predict a positive relationship between firm 
size (SIZE) and debt maturity. According to moral hazard, smaller firms are more likely to experience 
conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, leading to problems such as risk shifting, asset 
substitution and claim dilution. In addition, the signalling role of debt is more important in smaller 
firms, as smaller firms might communicate less information to outsiders leading to more informational 
asymmetries because of economies of scale in information production and distribution. This prediction 
is further strengthened by a number of other factors. Firstly, managers of small firms are more likely to 
hold a substantial amount of equity in the firms they manage, and thus will tend to be more risk 
seeking than managers of larger firms. Secondly, since small firms tend to have more growth options 
and thus higher agency costs than large firms, debtholders will tend to reduce the risk of lending to 
smaller firms by restricting the length of debt maturity. Finally, large firms tend to issue more long-
term debt because of easier access to capital markets, while smaller firms rely more heavily on bank 
debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Therefore, a positive 
relationship is predicted between debt maturity and firm size. 
                                                
7
 Ozkan (2000) finds some evidence of definition sensitivity. Our choice is restricted by data availability. 
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 Growth opportunity (GROW) is expected to be inversely related to long-term debt. The agency 
cost of debt is likely to be higher for high growth firms, as new investment can increase risk, and 
informational asymmetries also tend to increase with growth opportunities.  Myers (1977) suggests 
that agency related under-investment problems can be mitigated by issuing short-term debt that expires 
before the growth options are exercised. Issuing short-term debt also signals quality to the market 
(Flannery, 1986) and avoids the high information costs that come with long-term debt. However, the 
liquidity risk hypothesis predicts a positive relationship because firms can reduce the probability of 
inefficient liquidation of their risky growth opportunities by issuing long-term debt. Kane et al. (1985) 
and Sarkar (1999) argue that there is an inverse relationship between the optimal debt maturity and 
earnings volatility (VOL). Firms with low earnings volatility prefer longer debt maturity to avoid 
frequent re-balancing of their capital structure. On the contrary, firms with higher business risk are 
prone to higher agency costs, and thus they have an incentive to shorten debt maturity to lower agency 
costs. Therefore, a negative relationship between long-term debt and liquidity (LIQ) is expected. This 
is supported by Myers and Rajan’ s (1998) argument that excessive liquidity reduces manager’ s ability 
to commit credibly to investment. Managers can manipulate liquid assets in favour of shareholders and 
against debtholders’  interest. High liquidity thus reduces the firm’ s fund raising capacity and shortens 
the maturity of available debts. In addition, non-depreciating liquid assets, such as inventory, do not 
support long-term debt.  
 Profitability (PROF) is expected to be positively related to debt maturity, because profitable 
firms have higher taxable income, and thus receive greater tax benefits from long-term debt. Scherr 
and Hulburt (2001) propose that taxability can influence firms’  debt maturity because choosing long-
term debt over short-term debt can create a tax timing option to repurchase and re-issue debt. Antoniou 
et al. (2006) link the positive relationship between share price performance (SPP) and debt maturity 
structure to the signalling power of debt. For instance, if managers perceive that a drop in share price 
fails to reflect the ‘true’  (but unknown) value of the firm, they have a motivation to send a credible 
signal to the market. This can be done by issuing short-term debt, as it confirms that managers are 
prepared to be closely monitored and frequently assessed by lenders. Similarly, firms with favourable 
information tend to avoid long-term debt and issue short-term debt instead, because they hope to 
negotiate more favourable terms later. The relationship between asset maturity (AMAT) and debt 
maturity is expected to be positive, as firms tend to match the maturity structure of assets and 
liabilities to reduce the agency costs of debt (Myers, 1977). 
 The signalling hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between firm quality (QUA) and debt 
maturity. High quality firms tend to issue more short-term debt (Mitchell, 1991), while low quality 
firms do not mimic the behaviour of high quality firms because they cannot afford the high transaction 
costs of rolling over short-term debt. However, when considering liquidity risk, a non-monotonic 
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relationship is expected (Diamond, 1991). Although short-term debt carries high liquidity risk, high 
quality firms will prefer short-term debt because liquidity risk is less relevant to them. On the contrary, 
liquidity risk is crucial for medium quality firms, as a liquidity crisis can lead to credit rationing, or 
even liquidation.  Thus medium quality firms tend to issue longer-term debt in order to prevent the 
exposure to liquidity risk. Similarly, low quality firms would ideally like to use longer-term debt to 
prevent liquidity risk, but they may be unable to do so due to rationing from lenders.  Consequently, 
low quality firms are normally forced to issue short-term debt. Overall, the liquidity risk hypothesis 
predicts that low and high quality firms tend to borrow short-term, while long-term debt is preferred 
by medium quality firms. 
Finally, several studies (Ozkan, 2000; Antoniou et al., 2006) show that firms tend to set a target 
debt maturity ratio. If any deviation from the target occurs, the speed at which firms adjust their debt 
maturity structure towards the target depends on the costs of adjustment versus the costs of remaining 
off the target. The presence of a target ratio is tested in the paper by incorporating the one-period 
lagged debt maturity in a partial adjustment model. 
 
3.3 Country-Specific Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 
A limited number of recent studies have documented that corporate financing decisions are 
determined not only by firm-specific characteristics, but also by country-specific factors such as 
economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional environment (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2004; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Antoniou et al., 
2006). Different market conditions can influence firm’ s borrowing decisions by affecting the absolute 
level of long- and short-term debt and by creating incentives for firms to alter the maturity mix of debt 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). The country-specific explanatory variables used in the paper 
are classified into two groups: (i) market-wide determinants, which include economic development, 
bank development, stock market development, term structure of interest rates, and inflation; and (ii) 
legal and corporate governance determinants, which include quality of legal enforcement, legal 
protection, ownership concentration, and information intermediary activity.8  Table 2, Panel B and C, 
summarizes the relationship postulated by different theories between the variables in these two groups 
of country-specific determinants and debt maturity, and specifies the proxy measure used for each 
variable. 
                                                
8
 These factors are consistent with Fan et al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).  As suggested 
by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), significant changes in a country’ s legal system are infrequent, and 
indicators of the institutional environment, such as creditor rights and shareholder rights, are relatively stable 
over time. Therefore the indicators used in the paper are from previous studies as listed in Table 1. 
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With respect to market-wide determinants, Fan et al. (2004) suggest that firms in developing 
countries tend to use far less long-term debt than firms in developed countries. In order to test for this, 
a developing economy dummy variable (EDEV) is used, which might also capture an element of 
financial development not included in other institutional variables. Bank development (BKDEV) is 
expected to be inversely related to debt maturity, because short-term debt enables banks to use their 
comparative advantage in monitoring lenders (Fan et al., 2004). On the contrary, stock market 
development (MKDEV) is expected to be positively related to debt maturity. Grossman (1976) shows 
that market prices partially transmit information from the more informed to the less informed 
investors, making lending to quoted firms less risky. Thus, an active stock market may increase firms’  
ability to obtain long-term debt. However, there is also an incentive for firms in countries with 
developed stock markets to switch from long-term debt to equity, as the additional liquidity of the 
stock market encourages risk taking behaviour from well-informed investors (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999). This could lead stock market development to be negatively related to debt 
maturity because firms may want to use more short-term debt to reduce agency costs.   
 The tax hypothesis predicts that firms should employ more long-term debt when the term 
structure of interest rates (TERM) slopes upward. Brick and Ravid (1985) show that different time 
patterns of interest payments can affect the choice of debt maturity of firms. They suggest that firms 
lengthen their debt maturity when the term structure is upward sloping, because the tax-shield value of 
long-term debt is higher and because the interest tax shield of debt is accelerated by increasing the 
proportion of debt payments.9 Thus, issuing long-term debt can increase firm’ s value. On the contrary, 
market timing theory predicts a negative relationship.10 Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the 
interest yield curve appears to influence the maturity of new debt. When short-term interest rates are 
low in comparison to long-term interest rates, or when the term structure of interest rates is high, firms 
prefer to issue short-term debt while they are waiting for long-term interest rates to decline in future.  
This behaviour is also consistent with the optimistic behaviour of managers discussed by Baker et al. 
(2005). Finally, there is some evidence that an increase in inflation (INF) tends to reduce the use of 
long-term debt by both large and small firms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999), since debt 
contracts are generally based on nominal terms and thus high inflation may increase the interest rate 
risk faced by firms. 
Among the legal and governance determinants, the quality of legal enforcement is measured by 
the level of corruption (CORR), which is expected to be negatively related to corporate debt maturity. 
When the legal system has less integrity, or is inefficient, debt is used more than equity, and short-
                                                
9
 See also Ravid (1996). Long-term debt pays more interest in early periods and less interest in later periods than 
short-term debt. 
10
 Baker et al. (2005) summarize empirical studies on debt market timing and term structure of interest rates. 
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term debt more than long-term debt, since a shorter maturity limits the firm’ s opportunity to 
expropriate creditors (Fan et al., 2004).  Creditor rights (CRR) and shareholder rights (SHR) indexes 
are used to measure legal protection. Diamond (1991) argues that lenders who engage in monitoring 
have incentive to lend short-term. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) also suggest that strong 
creditor rights increase the incentive of banks to monitor firms. Shareholders’  protection, on the 
contrary, decreases the agency cost of debt. Consequently, in countries with strong shareholder rights, 
firms should need less short-term debt to mitigate agency problems. Therefore, creditor rights are 
expected to be negatively related to debt maturity, while a positive relationship between shareholder 
rights and debt maturity is expected.  When ownership concentration (OWN) is high, the interests of 
shareholders and managers align, leading to higher agency costs of debt. Therefore, the moral hazard 
hypothesis predicts that firms in countries with high ownership concentration should issue more short-
term debt in order to mitigate agency problems. This leads to the expectation of a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and debt maturity. Finally, the institutions that collect and 
disseminate information, such as auditors, may play a significant role in influencing debt maturity. 
Evidence shows that good quality external auditors are used more by firms with severe agency 
problems, since auditors enhance the credibility of public information by certifying the firm’ s 
accounts.  Thus, their presence should diminish the role of short-term debt in mitigating information 
problems and lead to a positive relationship between information intermediary activity (AUD) and 
debt maturity. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data  
The sample comprises of a panel of all firms in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, 
listed in the national stock exchanges for the period 1993-2001. Only financial firms and firms with 
missing observations during the sample period are excluded.11 Firm’ s financial data are obtained from 
Datastream. The final sample consists of 1,726 observations for Thai firms; 2,493 for Malaysian firms; 
1,164 for Singaporean firms; and 809 for Australian firms (see Appendix A for further details of 
sample composition). Because of the requirement of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
methodology employed in the paper, that firms with less than three consecutive observations are 
excluded, fewer observations are actually used when estimating by GMM. 
Table 3 presents the averages of the variables used to measure debt maturity, firm-specific and 
market-wide determinants. These averages are calculated over both the full sample period, and the pre 
and post-crisis sub-periods from the pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset. Countries are 
                                                
11
 Financial firms are excluded as their financial structure is affected by sector-specific factors, such as capital 
requirements. 
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combined by how severely they were hit by the crisis. As mentioned earlier, the two countries least 
affected by the crisis in the sample are Australia and Singapore, which are also classified as developed 
economies, while the most affected countries are Malaysia and Thailand, also classified as developing 
economies. The figures in table 3 present initial evidence that there were significant differences over 
the sample period in debt maturity pattern and both firm-specific and market-wide determinants 
between the two country groupings. Firms in developed economies have more long-term debts than 
firms in developing economies. Furthermore, the financial crisis had several significant effects on 
most factors, and not surprisingly more so in the countries most affected by the crisis. Overall, the 
crisis led firms in this region to issue higher debt on average, as equity issues became problematic in 
unstable markets. Growth opportunity, share price performance and the quality of the firms decreased 
significantly after the crisis, while asset maturity increased. Profitability changed significantly after the 
crisis in the countries most affected. Market-wide factors also changed considerably after the crisis.  
For both country groupings, bank’ s assets became larger relative to GDP. Stock markets were most 
severely hit in the countries most affected. In both country groupings, short-term interest rates 
increased relative to long-term rates, and inflation decreased after the crisis. Volatility in earnings and 
the liquidity of firms operating in any of the countries were affected significantly by the crisis. 
 [Insert Table 3] 
Figure 1 shows a comparison of debt maturity across sample countries during the sample period. 
Differences in debt maturity patterns appear to be linked to the level of economic development. For 
example, Australian firms had a considerably higher proportion of long-term debt, while Thai and 
Malaysian firms made more use of short-term debt. These observations are consistent with a number 
of studies that show that during the sample period Asian firms tended to be highly levered, with a high 
proportion of short-term debt, and that this contributed to the severity of the 1997 Asian crisis 
(Bleakley and Cowan, 2004; Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006). Figure 1 also shows that, although the 
debt maturity structure of the sample countries was fairly stable over the sample period, after the 1997 
crisis debt maturity continued to increase in the two more developed economies of Australia and 
Singapore. The evidence in Table 3 and Figure 1 motivates further analysis of the changes in the 
determinants of debt maturity structure after the Asian crisis. It also highlights important differences 
between the sample countries. 
[Insert Figure 1]  
 
4.2  Methodology 
To examine the role of the firm-specific determinants of debt maturity, equation (1) is firstly 
estimated on unbalanced panel data using Ordinary Least Square (OLS).  The individual firm’ s debt 
maturity structure is modelled as a function of k firm-specific factors for each country:  
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where, Yi,t is firm’ s i debt maturity at time t, measured at the accounting year-end; FFk,i,t is a vector of 
k firm i’ s firm-specific factors; D0 is a constant; and Dt captures firm-invariant time-specific effects, 
and it is the same for all firms at a given point in time but varies through time.12 The inclusion of Dt 
helps control for both observable and unobservable aggregate effects. 
To test for the existence of a target optimal debt maturity structure, lagged debt maturity is 
included in the model and a partial adjustment model (Ozkan, 2000; Antoniou et al., 2006) is adopted. 
If the firms had a target debt maturity ratio, then the coefficient of the one-period lagged debt maturity 
would be between 0 and 1. If the cost of diverging from the target is higher than the cost of 
adjustment, then the speed of adjustment (1–coefficient of the lagged debt maturity) is expected to be 
faster.13   
, 0 1 , 1 , , ,
1
(2)
N
i t i t k k i t i t i t
k
Y Y FFD E J D D P


     ¦  
Following the same notation as in equation (1), Yi,t is firm’ s i debt maturity at time t; Yi,t-1 is the 
same variable lagged one period; FFk,i,t is a vector of k firm i’ s firm-specific factors; Di and Dt 
represent time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects and time-specific effects which are 
common to all firms at a time but vary through the time; and the disturbance term Pi,t is time-varying 
and serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance V2. Hsiao (1985) suggests that the OLS 
estimation of this equation gives biased coefficients, due to the correlation between Pi,t and other 
variables, especially Yi,t-1. Therefore, the suitability of estimation techniques using alternative methods, 
such as OLS-first difference, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in the first differences (GMM-
DIF) as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), and system GMM (GMM-SYS) as suggested by 
Arellano and Bover (1995), is explored to control for endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and 
measurement error problems. Wherever appropriate, we apply the more efficient two-step GMM 
estimator and firms with less than three consecutive time series observations are dropped. In order to 
have a valid set of instruments, there should be no higher-order serial correlation and this is confirmed 
by the Sargan test.  
It is unlikely that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, because shocks that affect 
debt maturity structure may also affect other firm-specific factors. Therefore, the dependent variable is 
                                                
12
 All model specifications (with the exception of the dynamic model) include industry dummies to control for 
industry effects, but their coefficients are generally insignificant and thus not reported here.  
13
 A detailed discussion of speed of adjustment model in financial decisions can be found in Antoniou et al. 
(2006 and 2007). 
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treated as endogenous and the explanatory variables as weakly exogenous. Time dummies are 
included in all models. Industry dummies are included only in OLS equations in levels. As shown in 
Antoniou et al. (2006), GMM-SYS is the most appropriate method to estimate equation (2). However, 
due to data limitation, this estimation method can only be applied to the full sample, and for testing the 
effects of firm-specific characteristics. In other cases, OLS is used. 
To test whether differences in economic conditions between countries have any effect on 
corporate debt maturity structure, the data for the four sample countries are subsequently pooled to 
create one panel. Equation (1) is then augmented with country dummies, taking the value of 1 for 
Thailand (THDUM), Malaysia (MLDUM) and Singapore (SPDUM), and 0 otherwise. In addition, 
equation (1) is also re-estimated with OLS by replacing country dummies with the market-wide and 
legal and governance variables identified in Section 3.3 above, one at a time. Since the role of market-
wide determinants may vary depending on how severely the crisis hit different countries, and thus 
estimating across all countries may be misleading as effects may cancel out, the data for the four 
sample countries are subsequently divided into two groups: countries least affected and countries most 
affected by the Asian crisis. Equation (1) is then augmented again with market-wide factors, one at a 
time over the whole sample period. Finally, to further investigate the possible effects of the 1997 
Asian crisis, equation (1) augmented by the market-wide determinants is re-estimated with OLS over 
two sub-sample periods, the pre-crisis period between 1993 and 1996, and the post-crisis period 
between 1998 and 2001.14  Wald-statistics are estimated to test for any statistically significant change 
in the role of the identified variables as a consequence of the financial crisis. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Firm-specific effects on debt maturity by country over the full sample period 
Table 4 presents the estimates of equation (1) for each country over the full sample period.  As 
anticipated, leverage15 is found to be positively related to debt maturity, in line with previous studies 
such as Barclay and Smith (1995).16 The positive relationship supports the liquidity risk argument that 
                                                
14
 The crisis started in mid-July 1997. Therefore the data for 1997 are excluded from the sub-samples. 
15
 Various measures of leverage have been used in the literature. Due to data restrictions, the paper defines 
leverage as the ratio of total debt to total capital, following Rajan and Zingales (1995). To examine the 
sensitivity of the results to this definition, equation (1) was also estimated with leverage redefined as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets for Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The (unreported) results were statistically similar 
to those discussed in the paper.  
16
 Leverage could be significantly correlated with other variables in the model. Barclay et al. (2003) point out 
that the regression coefficients can be potentially biased and inconsistent when both leverage and investment 
opportunities are included in the regression as independent variables. Thus, alternative formulations were 
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higher leverage encourages firms to avoid short-term debt. It also implies that leverage and debt 
maturity are used as strategic complements to reduce the under-investment problem, as suggested by 
Barclay et al. (2003). Similarly, the coefficients of firm size are uniformly positive and significant 
across sample countries in line with Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996). This 
confirms the agency hypothesis that small firms are prone to higher agency costs of debt and thus tend 
to shorten their debt maturity to reduce these costs.  The findings also give support to the signalling 
hypothesis, which stipulates that small firms have higher levels of asymmetric information, and thus 
they are more motivated to use short-term debt to signal their quality to the market.  On the contrary, 
growth opportunity appears to have no influence in determining the debt maturity structure of firms in 
the sample countries, except for the positive and significant relationship found for Thai firms that 
contradicts the agency theory prediction, but is in line with the liquidity risk hypothesis.17 Debt 
maturity may not be used to reduce the under-investment problem, because firms in the sample 
countries, especially in Malaysia and Singapore, have highly concentrated ownership and a close 
relationship with their banks. 
[Insert Table 4] 
 The evidence on earnings volatility is mixed across countries, having a negative effect on debt 
maturity in Thailand and Singapore, but no effect in Malaysia and Australia.  This result, in line with 
other empirical studies (Guedes and Opler, 1996), supports the bankruptcy cost argument of Kane et 
al. (1985) and implies that high bankruptcy costs in Thailand and Singapore drive firms to issue 
shorter-term debt when their earnings volatility is high. Liquidity is positively related to debt maturity 
in all countries, consistent with the findings of Antoniou et al. (2006) for German firms. This suggests 
that firms in this region choose to issue more long-term debt when they are more liquid to avoid cash 
shortages and to lower their probability of bankruptcy. Mixed results are found for the relationship 
between profitability and debt maturity. The relationship is positive and significant for Thailand and 
Malaysia supporting the tax hypothesis that highly profitable firms minimize their tax liability by 
choosing longer-term debt. However, the relationship is negative and significant for Australian firms. 
This could be partly due to the higher cost of issuing long-term debt in Australia, which has a market-
based financial system. Mixed results are also found for the relationship between share price 
performance and debt maturity. Positive and significant relationships are observed for Singapore and 
Australia, supporting the signalling hypothesis that firms whose shares are perceived to under-perform 
tend to issue shorter-term debt to signal their quality to the market, while firms whose shares are 
                                                                                                                                                      
estimated excluding leverage from the model. The (unreported) estimates were similar to those presented in the 
paper, confirming that the results are robust and appear not to be affected by this potential problem. 
17
 Esho et al. (2002) obtain similar results for Australian firms. Deesomsak et al. (2004) find that growth 
opportunity has also no significant effect on the capital structure decision of Malaysian and Australian firms.  
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perceived to over-perform issue longer-term debt to exploit the market mis-pricing. However, no 
significant relationship is found for Thailand and Malaysia. This discrepancy can be due to the fact 
that in countries with more developed financial markets information and signalling play a more 
fundamental role in share price formation than in countries with less developed and thus less efficient 
markets. Strong support is found for the maturity-matching hypothesis, as asset maturity is positively 
related to debt maturity in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The insignificant relationship found in 
Australia lends support to Guedes and Opler (1996) that matching maturity of assets and liabilities is 
not a universal practice. The effect of firm quality on debt maturity is mixed among sample countries, 
with only a significant negative effect found among Thai firms, consistent with other studies (Guedes 
and Opler, 1996). This finding gives little support to the signalling hypothesis and may also reflect the 
preference of financial markets to provide short-term debt to quality firms.18 
In summary, the findings presented in Table 4 show that some determinants are more powerful 
and consistent than others in explaining the choice of debt maturity of firms operating in the Asia 
Pacific region.19 Overall, the findings lend support to the liquidity risk hypothesis, and the signalling 
hypothesis, but provide mixed support for the moral hazard hypothesis.20 Although small firms use 
short-term debt to mitigate the agency cost of debt and almost all firms try to match the maturity of 
assets and liabilities, the relationship between growth opportunity and debt maturity is mixed, leading 
to only moderate support for the agency hypothesis. Furthermore, the results show considerable 
variation in the importance of the determinants of debt maturity across sample countries, motivating 
further investigation into the effects of country-specific variables.  
                                                
18
 As Altman’ s Z-score may be correlated to other firm-specific variables, equation (1) was also re-estimated 
using abnormal earnings as a proxy of firm quality. Following Barclay and Smith (1995), abnormal earnings 
were defined as (Earnings per sharet+1 – Earnings per sharet)/ Share pricet. The (unreported) findings were 
statistically consistent with the results presented in the paper. 
19
 Further tests were also conducted to ensure the robustness of the results.  Equation (1) was re-estimated on 
cross-sectional data following Rajan and Zingales (1995), since cross-sectional analysis preserves the dispersion 
across firms and eliminates the serial correlation problem in residuals, which may tend to inflate the t-statistics 
of the coefficients estimated in pooled and fixed effects regressions. Furthermore, Equation (1) was also re-
estimated using fixed company effects, where the firm-specific time-series mean for each variable is subtracted 
from each observation.  A fixed effects regression is used as an alternative method for dealing with the problem 
of serially correlated errors. The main difference between pooled and fixed effects regressions is that the fixed 
effects model allows for firm-specific regression intercepts (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). The results from both the 
cross-sectional and fixed company effects estimations are statistically consistent with the results presented in the 
paper, and are available from the authors on request. 
20
 These hypotheses/arguments are not mutually exclusive. They can have multiple and offsetting effects on a 
firm’ s debt maturity choice. 
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5.2. Debt Maturity Dynamics 
 Table 5 presents the estimates of equation (2) using OLS in levels, OLS-first difference, GMM-
DIF and GMM-SYS methodologies. In line with the findings of Ozkan (2000), the results show biased 
estimates from the OLS specification, indicating the presence of firm-specific effects.  There is 
evidence of upward bias on the coefficient of the lagged debt maturity in the OLS level specification 
and downward bias in the OLS first-difference. Also the GMM-DIF estimates result in larger 
variances than those from GMM-SYS. In line with Antoniou et al. (2006), the findings confirm that 
GMM-SYS is the most appropriate technique, and thus the following comments are based on the 
GMM-SYS findings for Model-4 in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 For all sample countries, AR(1) suggests a negative first-order serial correlation, while AR(2) 
suggests the absence of second-order serial correlation, satisfying the assumption of no higher-order 
serial correlation. All Wald statistics of joint significance of the regressors (Wald Test 1) are 
significant. Sargan test indicates that the instruments used are valid and not correlated with the error 
term. The coefficients of lagged debt maturity are positive. The estimates suggest that firms in this 
region have a target optimal debt maturity structure, and they adjust to their targets relatively fast. 
Australian firms have the highest adjustment speed (0.69), while the adjustment process is relatively 
costly and slow for Malaysian firms (0.47). With regard to other firm-specific variables, the results do 
not vary much from those in Table 4 discussed in the previous section, except for the role of asset 
maturity that becomes insignificant. In summary, large, highly levered, highly liquid and highly 
profitable firms prefer to use long-term as opposed to short-term debt. 
 
5.3 Country-specific effects on debt maturity over the full sample period 
Table 6, Panel A, presents the results of estimating equation (1) with the inclusion of country 
dummies and market-wide factors as discussed in Section 3.3, using panel data that combine all firms 
across all sample countries over the whole sample period. The coefficients of the firm-specific 
variables are consistent with the ones presented in the previous section.  All country dummies 
coefficients are highly significant, showing that country-specific factors play a part in the debt 
maturity choice of firms in this region. To investigate this finding further, country dummies are 
replaced with several country-specific factors. Economic development is found to have a highly 
significant and negative effect, implying that firms in developing countries tend to issue less long-term 
debt, a result that contradicts the findings of Fan et al. (2004). On the contrary, the significantly 
negative coefficient of bank development supports Fan et al.’ s (2004) argument about the monitoring 
role of banks. The term structure of interest rates is also negatively related to debt maturity, lending 
support to the market timing hypothesis. 
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[Insert Table 6] 
 Table 6, Panel B, presents the results of estimating equation (1) with the inclusion of legal and 
corporate governance determinants. As predicted and in line with Fan et al. (2004) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), the corruption level is negatively associated with debt maturity, 
implying a positive relationship between legal enforcement and debt maturity, and supporting the 
monitoring function of short-term debt. Legal protection is also found to be a significant factor in 
determining firm’ s debt maturity choice. In line with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), firms in 
countries with superior creditor rights use relatively more short-term debt, implying that the ability of 
firms to use short-term debt is higher when creditors are better protected, as banks have more 
incentives to monitor borrowers. On the contrary, firms in countries with higher shareholder rights use 
more long-term debt since the agency cost of debt is lower and thus the need to use short-term loans to 
mitigate agency problems is reduced. Ownership concentration has a negative and significant 
relationship with debt maturity, in support of the moral hazard hypothesis. Finally, consistent with Fan 
and Wong’ s (2002), a positive relationship is found between the market share of the big-5 auditors 
and debt maturity, highlighting the important role of auditors in facilitating the transmission of 
information. 
Since the findings in Table 6 reflect the aggregate effects across all sample countries, the 
estimated coefficients may hide the conflicting country-specific influence that some determinants may 
have on debt maturity. In particular, given that the sample countries were at different stages of 
economic development and were hit by the crisis by different degrees, some of the true market-wide 
effects may have been washed out when estimated over the full set of countries. It is an important 
question whether the identified market-wide determinants had a different impact on the countries in 
our sample depending upon their stage of development and vulnerability to the crisis. Table 7 presents 
the findings from estimating equation (1) augmented by market-wide factors for the pooled panels of 
the two groups of countries, least and most affected by the crisis, as defined in Section 4.1. The 
negative and significant coefficient of bank development for the sample of least affected countries 
supports the findings of Fan et al. (2004) that in developed economies banks are able to take full 
advantage of their monitoring power and act as information providers to other creditors. Thus, the 
larger the banking sector, the more firms are encouraged to issue short-term debt. On the contrary, in 
less developed countries (most affected by the crisis) a positive and significant relationship shows that 
a larger banking sector leads to more long-term debts, consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic’ s (1999) argument that in developing countries with weaker legal systems, a larger 
banking sector is associated with longer-maturity debt, as creditor’ s rights are strengthen by the size of 
the banking sector. In addition, the closer relationship between firms and their banks in developing 
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countries, and the lack of an efficient equity market, may also encourage banks to grant relatively 
more long-term debt.   
[Insert Table 7] 
The findings in table 7 also reveal an opposite pattern in the relationships between stock market 
development and the term structure of interest rates and debt maturity between the two groups of 
countries. In the countries least affected by the crisis, where stock markets are relatively more 
developed and firms can more easily raise equity finance, firms are found to hold relatively shorter 
maturity debt. The reverse is true for firms in the most affected countries, where stock markets are less 
developed. Consistent with the tax hypothesis, firms in the countries most affected by the crisis 
employ more long-term debt when the term structure of interest rates has a positive slope. On the other 
hand, the market timing hypothesis dominates the effect in the least affected countries, in line with the 
findings of Guedes and Opler (1996).21 This latter finding shows some evidence of less than fully 
rational behaviour of managers (optimism) as discussed in Baker et al. (2005), namely that managers 
time their debt maturity choice by issuing short-term debt when the term spread is high, in order to 
wait for the expected decline of long-term rates. Finally, in line with Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic’ s (1999), high inflation is negatively related to the use of long-term debt in the countries 
most affected by the crisis.  
In summary, the results confirm that market-wide determinants are as important as firm-specific 
characteristics in determining debt maturity structure. These market-wide determinants not only 
influence the maturity of firm’ s borrowing, but they also appear to have different effects depending on 
the country’ s economic development. As the most developed countries in the sample coincide with the 
countries least affected by the Asian crisis, it is interesting to further investigate whether the role of 
firm-specific and market-wide determinants changed as a direct result of the crisis. 
 
5.4 The effects of the 1997 Asian crisis 
Table 8 presents the results relating to firm-specific and market-wide determinants over the pre- 
and post-crisis periods for the two country groupings identified. Firstly, the Asian crisis appears to 
have had different effects between the country groups on the relationship between debt maturity and 
leverage, earnings volatility, profitability and asset maturity.  Leverage was positively related to debt 
maturity in both the pre- and post-crisis periods.  However, the role of long-term debt in offsetting the 
higher liquidity risk and in delaying the exposure to bankruptcy reduced substantially after the crisis 
                                                
21
 Previous studies (e.g. Antoniou et al., 2006) also find mixed effects of the term structure of interest rates on 
debt maturity.  Barclay and Smith (1995) show that this result may depend on the methodology applied.  They 
find a negative and significant relationship when panel data are used in pooled OLS and fixed effects, but an 
insignificant relationship when cross-sectional data are used. 
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especially in the countries least affected by the crisis. Earnings volatility played no role in the most 
affected countries in either pre- or post-crisis periods, whereas it became a significant negative factor 
in the least affected countries after the crisis. This negative relationship implies a stronger agency 
effect in the more developed markets and it is consistent with several studies of developed markets 
(Guedes and Opler, 1996; Ozkan, 2002). On the contrary, the relationship between profitability and 
debt maturity in the most affected countries became significantly positive in the post-crisis period, 
implying that the financial crisis might have raised the firm’ s awareness of tax effects. While the crisis 
had no impact on the role of asset maturity in the most affected countries, the relationship between 
debt maturity and asset maturity became significantly positive after the crisis for the least affected 
countries, implying that maturity matching became important only after the crisis.  
Secondly, the crisis appears to have had similar effects on the relationship between debt 
maturity and liquidity and share price performance in both country groupings, regardless of how 
severely they were hit by the crisis. Although before the crisis liquidity played no role, after the crisis 
it became a significant positive factor in determining debt maturity. This implies that after the crisis 
firms with higher levels of liquidity chose to issue long-term debt to avoid cash shortages. Share price 
performance became insignificant after the crisis, as stock market uncertainty increased in both 
country groupings. Thirdly, the results also reveal that the financial crisis did not alter the effects of 
firm size, growth opportunity and firm quality, in line with previous evidence on the pre- and post-
crisis effects of these variables on leverage in the same sample countries (Deesomsak et al., 2004).    
[Insert Table 8] 
 
In relation to the market-wide determinants, all coefficients are highly significant in both 
country groupings in the pre and post-crisis periods, and the direction of the effects is in line with the 
findings for the whole sample period presented in Table 7. Thus, overall the crisis did not alter the 
contrasting effects of market-wide determinants observed earlier.  However, it significantly changed 
the size of their impact, especially in the less developed countries. The coefficient of inflation is the 
only one that changes sign after the crisis and becomes positive for both country groupings. This may 
explain why inflation appeared insignificant in the previous aggregate analysis of the whole sample 
period, as significant negative and positive effects cancelled each other out. Over the pre-crisis period 
higher inflation appears to have been associated with reduced long-term debt to minimise the interest 
rate risk, consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper investigates the potential effects of firm-specific as well as country-specific 
characteristics, such as economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional set-up, on the debt 
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maturity structure of firms. It also provides the first evidence on the effects of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis on the determinants of corporate debt maturity choice of firms operating in the region. Several 
conclusions emerge. First, firms in this region do have a target debt maturity structure. They move 
towards their target relatively quickly implying that the cost of being in disequilibrium, relative to the 
costs of moving towards the target, is high. Second, the debt maturity structure of firms in the Asia 
Pacific region is strongly related to a number of firm-specific and market-wide factors, as well as the 
country’ s corporate governance, and the legal and institutional environment.  These findings are 
consistent with a number of previous empirical studies, and offer further evidence for the Asia Pacific 
region. Third, the evidence supports the view that the debt maturity structure decision can affect the 
cost of external finance and plays an important role in alleviating some capital market imperfections. 
In particular, firms with high leverage and growth opportunity use long-term debt to offset the higher 
probability of a liquidity crisis and to reduce their exposure to bankruptcy risk. The evidence also 
shows that firms with high information asymmetry and good news to reveal can signal to the market 
by opting for short-term debt. In addition, small firms and firms with high earnings volatility can 
reduce their agency cost by using short-term debt. Therefore, the findings provide strong support to 
the liquidity risk hypothesis and the signalling hypothesis, and mixed evidence in support of the moral 
hazard hypothesis.  
Fourth, the results show that the debt maturity structure decision can also help to alleviate the 
shortcomings of the legal and corporate governance systems. For example, in countries with low legal 
protection and monitoring, short-term debt is preferred to mitigate information problem. Short-term 
debt is also found to reduce the agency costs of firms with low shareholder’ s protection or with high 
ownership concentration. Market-wide factors are also found to influence the maturity of firm’ s debt, 
and this effect depends on the country’ s economic development. For example, in developed economies 
banks can take full advantage of their monitoring power and act as information providers to other 
creditors. In less developed economies, the closer relationship between firms and their banks, in the 
absence of efficient capital markets, can encourage banks to grant relatively longer-term debt.  
Fifth, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 appears to have had several significant effects on both 
the firm-specific and market-wide determinants of debt maturity structure, especially in Thailand and 
Malaysia where the crisis originated. However, even in the countries least affected by the crisis, the 
debt maturity decision of firms was affected. More specifically, the relationship between debt maturity 
structure and many of its determinants changed significantly after the crisis, both in size and/or 
direction. For example, profitable firms seem to have been more concerned about their tax expenses 
after the crisis. Similarly, banks became more cautious in offering long-term debt to high-levered 
firms. This forced firms to issue more short-term debt, also reducing the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outside investors, especially in the countries most affected by the crisis. Finally, 
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the crisis forced managers to recognise the importance of an appropriate debt maturity structure for 
their firms, in terms of both reducing funding costs and liquidity constraints, and improving the 
information flow to outside investors and thus agency problems. 
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Figure 1 
Average debt maturity ratios (long-term debt / total debt)  in the sample 
countries: 1993 - 2001
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Table 1: Major indicators of economic condition, corporate governance and institutional environment in the sample countries. 
 
 Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia Definitions Source 
Economic Condition       
   Bank Development 5.0553 5.5927 8.0553 1.0101 The ratio of bank assets to GDP Datastream 
   Stock Market Development 2.0826 5.1284 5.4856 0.8061 The ratio of market capitalization to GDP Datastream 
   Economic Development Developing Developing Developed Developed Indicates whether the country is classified as developed or 
developing according to the World Bank classification 
based on countries’  gross national income levels. 
Fan et al. (2004) 
   Term Structure of Interest Rates -0.1981 -1.8475 -2.7007 -16.4418 Government Bond Yield (long-term) – Lending Rate 
(Monthly) 
Datastream 
   Inflation 4.58 3.41 5.70 1.74 Changes in Consumer Price Index (quarterly) Datastream 
Rule of Law and Legal Protection       
   Corruption  6.95 4.9 0.87 1.45 This index ranges from 0 to 10. Larger value indicates 
more severe corruption 
Fan et al. (2004) 
   Creditor Rights 3 4 4 1 This index aggregates different creditor rights. It ranges 
from 0 to 4 and is formed by adding 1 when 
(1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors’  
consent or minimum dividends to file for 
reorganization; 
(2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their 
security once the reorganization petition has been 
approved (no automatic stay); 
(3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of 
the proceeds that result from the disposition of the 
assets of a bankrupt firm; and 
(4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its 
property pending the resolution of the reorganization. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
   Shareholder Rights 2 4 4 4 This index aggregates the shareholder rights. It ranges from 
0 to 6 and is formed by adding 1 when 
(1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy 
vote to the firm 
(2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares 
prior to the general shareholders’  meeting, 
(3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is allowed, 
(4) an opposed minorities mechanism is in place, 
(5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles 
a shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’  meeting is less than or equal to 10% 
(the sample median), or 
(6) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be 
waived only by a shareholders’  vote. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Ownership Concentration 0.47 0.54 0.49 0.28 Ownership by the 3 largest shareholders of 10 largest non-
financial domestic firms 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Big-5 Auditors’ Market Share 0.58 0.66 0.99 0.89 The share of assets of listed companies audited by the big-
five auditors 
Fan et al. (2004) 
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Table 2 : Expected relation between debt maturity structure and firm-specific and country-specific determinants. 
 
Panel A : Firm-Specific Determinants 
 
Determinants Measurement Positive Negative Mostly found / 
Expected 
relation 
Leverage (LEV) Debt to total capital = Total debt 
/ (Total debt + MV of equity + 
BV of preference share) 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Moral hazard hypothesis Positive 
Firm Size (SIZE) Natural Logarithm of assets Moral hazard hypothesis 
Signalling hypothesis 
Access to the market, 
transaction cost 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Positive 
Growth Opportunity 
(GROW) 
(Total assets – Book value of 
equity + Market value of equity) 
/ Total assets 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Moral hazard hypothesis 
Signalling hypothesis 
Negative 
Earnings Volatility 
(VOL) 
Absolute value of {[(EBITt – 
EBITt-1)] /EBITt-1}- average of 
{[(EBITt – EBITt-1)]/EBITt-1} 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Moral hazard hypothesis 
Bankruptcy cost 
Negative 
Liquidity (LIQ) Current assets/ Current liabilities - Capacity Negative 
Profitability (PROF) Earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciation/ Total assets 
Tax hypothesis - Positive 
Share Price Performance 
(SPP) 
Changes in share prices Signalling hypothesis 
Market timing theory 
Optimistic behaviour Positive 
Asset Maturity (AMAT) Total fixed assets / Total assets Moral hazard hypothesis 
Liquidity, financial 
distress, cash flow 
Priority of claim Positive 
Firm Quality (QUA) Altman’ s Z-score - Signalling hypothesis 
Moral hazard hypothesis 
Liquidity risk hypothesis 
(non-monotonic) 
Negative 
/ Non-
monotonic 
 
Panel B : Market-Wide Determinants 
 
Determinants Measurement Positive Negative Mostly found / 
Expected 
relation 
Economy Development 
(EDEV) 
Dummy equal to 1 for 
developing economy and 0 
otherwise 
- Maturity of the market Negative 
Bank Development 
(BKDEV) 
Bank assets / GDP Creditor rights Monitoring system Negative 
Stock market 
development (MKDEV) 
Market capitalization / GDP Information Other sources of finance Positive 
Term Structure of Interest 
Rates (TERM) 
Government Bond Yield (long-
term) – Lending Rate 
Tax Hypothesis Market timing theory 
Optimistic behaviour 
Positive 
Inflation (INF) Changes in consumer price index - Uncertainty Negative 
 
Panel C : Legal and Governance Determinants 
 
Determinants Measurement Positive Negative Mostly found / 
Expected 
relation 
Quality of Legal 
Enforcement (CORR) 
Corruption level (See Table 1) - Moral hazard hypothesis Negative 
Legal protection (CRR 
and SHR) 
Creditor rights (See Table 1) 
Shareholder rights (See Table 1) 
- 
Moral hazard hypothesis 
Monitoring System 
- 
Negative 
Positive 
Ownership Concentration 
(OWN) 
Ownership by the 3 largest 
shareholders of 10 largest non-
financial domestic firms (See 
Table 1) 
- Moral hazard hypothesis Negative 
The presence of 
information 
intermediaries (AUD) 
The share of assets of listed 
companies audited by the big-
five auditors (See Table 1) 
Moral hazard hypothesis - Positive 
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Table 3: Averages of firm-specific and market-wide variables. 
 
Countries Least Affected by the Crisis Countries Most Affected by the Crisis Variable 
Full Sample 
(1993 - 2001) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1993 - 1996) 
Post-Crisis 
(1998 - 2001) 
Full Sample 
(1993 - 2001) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1993 - 1996) 
Post-Crisis 
(1998 - 2001) 
MAT 0.5162 0.4903 0.5290 *** 0.3000 *** 0.2801 0.3044 *** 
t-statistics   (-2.6283)  (27.7018)   (-2.7814)  
LEV 0.2146 0.1685 0.2478 *** 0.3342 *** 0.1930 0.4247 *** 
t-statistics   (-10.5588)  (-22.8519)   (-34.1152)  
SIZE 12.1741 12.1175 12.2026  13.2509 *** 13.2692 13.2202  
t-statistics   (-1.1857)  (-27.4032)   (0.9552)  
GROW -2.9056 -4.3510 -2.3118 * 1.7701 *** 2.4793 1.2652 *** 
t-statistics   (-1.7544)  (-9.2846)   (16.6497)  
VOL 3.4567 3.6560 3.2256  2.8833  2.7336 3.0501  
t-statistics   (0.6078)  (1.6085)   (-0.8973)  
LIQ 2.3815 2.4432 2.3598  1.7119 *** 1.7495 1.6901  
t-statistics   (0.4531)  (7.5631)   (0.8461)  
PROF 0.0789 0.0713 0.0789  0.0811  0.1274 0.0496 *** 
t-statistics   (-0.4834)  (-0.3513)   (17.2047)  
SPP -0.0344 0.1201 -0.1101 *** -0.1349 *** 0.0716 -0.1222 *** 
t-statistics   (10.8188)  (7.1901)   (11.3368)  
AMAT 0.3431 0.3311 0.3502 ** 0.3995 *** 0.3897 0.4068 *** 
t-statistics   (-2.2973)  (-11.6291)   (-2.6642)  
QUA 0.0505 1.1523 -0.4806 *** 4.3623 *** 7.3903 2.3712 *** 
t-statistics   (3.6640)  (-16.6131)   (10.2228)  
BKDEV 5.3197 4.7229 5.9479 *** 5.4288 ** 4.7038 5.9828 *** 
t-statistics   (-11.7609)  (-2.1736)   (-128.7655)  
MKDEV 3.6686 3.7920 3.6902  4.1985 *** 5.3815 3.1652 *** 
t-statistics   (1.3760)  (-13.2042)   (61.8787)  
TERM -8.0395 -9.1865 -6.8674 *** -1.8880 *** -1.7694 -1.7040 *** 
t-statistics   (-11.3347)  (-63.0023)   (-2.9289)  
INF 4.4598 7.7899 2.0238 *** 3.3465 *** 4.0405 2.4312 *** 
t-statistics   (23.1601)  (9.2681)   (47.7391)  
 
Debt maturity (MAT) is the proportion of long-term debt to total debt. Leverage (LEV) is the debt to capital ratio. Firm size (SIZE) 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Growth opportunity (GROW) is the ratio of book value of total assets less book value of 
equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets. Earnings volatility (VOL) is the absolute difference between annual 
percentage change in earnings before interest and taxes and the average of this change. Liquidity (LIQ) is the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities. Profitability (PROF) is the ratios of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation to total assets. Share price 
performance (SPP) is the first difference of logs of annual share price. Asset Maturity (AMAT) is the ratio of total fixed assets to 
total assets. Firm quality (QUA) is Altman’ s Z-Score. Bank development (BKDEV) is the ratio of bank assets to GDP. Stock market 
development (MKDEV) is the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Term structure of interest rates (TERM) is the differences 
between government bond yield and lending rate. Inflation (INF) is changes in consumer price index.   
*, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Pooled time series and cross sectional analysis of firm-specific determinants by country: 1993 - 2001. 
 
Equation Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia 
Constant -0.5640 *** -0.8712 *** -0.5361 *** -0.2086  
t-statistics (-3.6100)  (-6.6400)  (-3.4400)  (-1.4100)  
LEV 0.2223 *** 0.1086 ** 0.2142 *** 0.3598 *** 
t-statistics (5.2700)  (2.3500)  (3.0500)  (4.0000)  
SIZE 0.0403 *** 0.0718 *** 0.0601 *** 0.0546 *** 
t-statistics (3.7000)  (9.6400)  (5.8300)  (4.8500)  
GROW 0.0587 *** 0.0066  0.0147  0.0001  
t-statistics (3.7800)  (1.2200)  (0.6290)  (0.1220)  
VOL -0.0014 ** 0.0002  -0.0017 *** 0.0005  
t-statistics (-2.3700)  (0.2940)  (-3.1100)  (0.8640)  
LIQ 0.0554 *** 0.0280 *** 0.0544 ** 0.0126 * 
t-statistics (5.2500)  (3.1100)  (2.1800)  (1.8500)  
PROF 0.3574 *** 0.1268 *** 0.1289  -0.1081 *** 
t-statistics (4.4700)  (4.4400)  (0.8980)  (-3.4200)  
SPP -0.0074  0.0053  0.0274 ** 0.0387 ** 
t-statistics (-0.7180)  (0.8560)  (2.0400)  (2.2800)  
AMAT 0.2489 *** 0.2218 *** 0.2789 *** 0.1096  
t-statistics (4.0100)  (4.6800)  (4.0000)  (1.2800)  
QUA -0.0277 *** -0.0007  -0.0095  0.0023  
t-statistics (-4.7200)  (-1.0900)  (-1.3700)  (1.4100)  
R2 0.2478  0.1794  0.2540  0.3019  
Adj R2 0.2358  0.1701  0.2363  0.2769  
No. of obs. 1726  2493  1164  809  
 
, 0 , , ,
1
(1)
N
i t k k i t t i t
k
Y FFD J D P

   ¦  
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Industry and time dummies 
were included in the model in order to control for industry and time effects but no statistically significant effect was 
found. See Table 3 and Section 3 for the definition of the variables. 
*, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Dynamic debt maturity structure by country: 1993 – 2001. 
 
Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia 
OLS-level OLS-DIF GMM-DIF GMM-SYS OLS-level OLS-DIF GMM-DIF GMM-SYS OLS-level OLS-DIF GMM-DIF GMM-SYS OLS-level OLS-DIF GMM-DIF GMM-SYS 
Equation 
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 
Constant 
 
-0.2691*** 
 
0.0133 
 
0.0369 
 
-0.6217** 
 
-0.2840*** 
 
-0.0274 
 
-0.0046 
 
-0.5366*** 
 
-0.2021* 
 
-0.0069 
 
-0.0167 
 
-0.7261** 
 
-0.0250 
 
0.0424 
 
0.0476 
 
-0.2240 
t-statistics (-3.7100) (0.8090) (1.1900) (-2.0800) (-2.9700) (-0.6240) (-0.0977) (-3.0000) (-1.7200) (-0.2390) (-0.4000) (-2.4600) (-0.2780) (1.5200) (1.2700) (-0.8770) 
 
MATt-1 
 
0.5927*** 
 
-0.2451*** 
 
0.3623*** 
 
0.4200*** 
 
0.6189*** 
 
-0.1889*** 
 
0.4012*** 
 
0.5273*** 
 
0.5552*** 
 
-0.2541*** 
 
0.1616** 
 
0.3621*** 
 
0.5936*** 
 
-0.2852*** 
 
0.1178 
 
0.3109*** 
t-statistics (20.5000) (-6.6300) (4.000) (6.7100) (28.7000) (-6.1200) (6.1700) (9.7600) (15.0000) (-6.8900) (2.5400) (5.3600) (11.4000) (-5.8800) (1.4900) (3.9500) 
 
LEV 
 
0.1590*** 
 
0.2692*** 
 
0.2547 
 
0.1705** 
 
0.0899*** 
 
0.0274 
 
-0.2629 
 
0.0694 
 
0.0840 
 
0.2275** 
 
0.1479 
 
0.2390** 
 
0.2059*** 
 
0.3690** 
 
0.2932 
 
0.2679* 
t-statistics (5.3300) (3.9100) (1.3900) (2.5300) (3.5200) (0.4430) (-1.4500) (1.3600) (1.5300) (2.2300) (0.6010) (2.4800) (3.0500) (2.4300) (1.2600) (1.8400) 
 
SIZE 
 
0.0143*** 
 
-0.0043 
 
-0.0981 
 
0.0445** 
 
0.0267*** 
 
0.1127*** 
 
0.0799 
 
0.0460*** 
 
0.0274*** 
 
-0.0066 
 
0.0272 
 
0.0650*** 
 
0.0163** 
 
0.0358 
 
0.1320 
 
0.0387* 
t-statistics (3.1500) (-0.2630) (-1.1600) (2.1400) (6.0800) (4.8600) (1.4800) (3.9800) (3.8900) (-0.1190) (0.2590) (2.9100) (2.2100) (0.6100) (1.1700) (1.8500) 
 
GROW 
 
0.0455*** 
 
-0.0090 
 
0.0420 
 
0.0014 
 
0.0121** 
 
0.0105 
 
0.0194 
 
0.0167** 
 
-0.0083 
 
-0.0420 
 
0.0019 
 
-0.0094 
 
0.0003 
 
-0.0003 
 
-0.0017 
 
0.0000 
t-statistics (3.0900) (-0.3890) (0.9270) (0.0564) (2.3100) (1.0500) (1.1400) (2.1000) (-0.4830) (-1.4900) (0.0253) (-0.3450) (0.4770) (-0.1270) (-0.4390) (-0.0152) 
 
VOL 
 
-0.0013*** 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0017*** 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0006 
 
-0.0004 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0015 
 
-0.0008*** 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
-0.0008*** 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0006** 
 
-0.0003 
t-statistics (-2.8700) (0.4680) (2.8500) (0.1810) (0.6920) (-0.3760) (0.1960) (1.2200) (-2.8500) (-0.5150) (0.4230) (-2.6400) (-0.9270) (-0.3570) (2.0200) (-0.7320) 
 
LIQ 
 
0.0468*** 
 
0.0496*** 
 
0.0728** 
 
0.0628*** 
 
0.0346*** 
 
0.0339*** 
 
0.0529*** 
 
0.0486*** 
 
0.0243 
 
0.0387 
 
0.1227** 
 
0.0688* 
 
0.0126*** 
 
0.0181* 
 
0.0357* 
 
0.0204*** 
t-statistics (4.7900) (2.6600) (2.3100) (3.7200) (6.0000) (2.6000) (3.1600) (4.0100) (1.1400) (1.1500) (2.4700) (1.6900) (3.7800) (1.8800) (1.8700) (3.4300) 
 
PROF 
 
0.2155*** 
 
0.0199 
 
-0.0741 
 
0.2082** 
 
0.1390*** 
 
0.0394 
 
0.0611 
 
0.0936** 
 
0.0567 
 
-0.0569 
 
0.1308 
 
0.3524* 
 
-0.0648 
 
-0.1046 
 
-0.2220 
 
-0.0725 
t-statistics (3.5100) (0.2680) (-0.4040) (2.0200) (4.4800) (1.4000) (1.5400) (2.0300) (0.4000) (-0.3300) (0.5930) (1.7600) (-0.6800) (-0.6130) (-1.4900) (-0.6520) 
 
SPP 
 
-0.0174* 
 
-0.0282*** 
 
-0.0718*** 
 
-0.0437*** 
 
0.0039 
 
0.0040 
 
0.0182 
 
-0.0015 
 
-0.0007 
 
-0.0101 
 
0.0057 
 
-0.0071 
 
0.0389** 
 
0.0269 
 
0.0389 
 
0.0515** 
t-statistics (-1.7700) (-3.2300) (-3.1100) (-4.0100) (0.5760) (0.8470) (1.6100) (-0.2130) (-0.0490) (-0.7850) (0.1970) (-0.3840) (2.2200) (1.3700) (0.9860) (2.4400) 
 
AMAT 
 
0.1075*** 
 
-0.0489 
 
0.1581 
 
-0.0614 
 
0.1040*** 
 
0.2235** 
 
0.0587 
 
0.1053 
 
0.1060** 
 
0.0475 
 
0.2809 
 
0.1242 
 
0.0603 
 
0.3274* 
 
0.2794 
 
0.1197 
t-statistics (3.0200) (-0.5230) (0.5370) (-0.5170) (3.7600) (2.4700) (0.2450) (1.2100) (2.0900) (0.3640) (0.6930) (0.8560) (1.0600) (1.7600) (0.7210) (0.9910) 
 
QUA 
 
-0.0191*** 
 
-0.0053 
 
-0.0239* 
 
-0.0150 
 
-0.0018** 
 
-0.0007 
 
-0.0002 
 
-0.0015 
 
-0.0014 
 
0.0085 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.0024 
 
0.0018 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0022 
t-statistics (-3.9900) (-0.6140) (-1.9200) (-1.3800) (-2.3200) (-0.3660) (-0.0957) (-0.8710) (-0.2400) (0.6910) (-0.0042) (-0.2390) (1.5200) (0.4740) (0.0058) (1.1100) 
 
AR (1) 
 
-1.306 
 
-2.409** 
 
-5.602*** 
 
-5.959*** 
 
0.028 
 
-3.266*** 
 
-6.198*** 
 
-6.628*** 
 
-0.466 
 
-0.434 
 
-4.032*** 
 
-4.793*** 
 
-1.229 
 
-1.002 
 
-2.575** 
 
-0.3160*** 
AR (2) 1.129 -3.474*** 0.225 0.794 1.730* -2.754*** 0.701 0.884 2.393** -2.612*** -0.037 0.333 0.353 -1.538 0.490 1.110 
Wald Test 1(df) 1595.00 (21)*** 96.85 (10)*** 51.79 (10)*** 131.10 (10)*** 2313.00 (21)*** 93.08 (10)*** 65.48 (10)*** 227.90 (10)*** 1204.00 (21)*** 73.28 (10)*** 19.52 (10)** 162.20 (10)*** 844.60 (21)*** 47.54 (10)*** 41.93 (10)*** 65.06 (10)*** 
Wald Test 2(df) 30.27 (7)*** 8.61 (6) 9.51 (6) 18.83 (7)*** 65.09 (8)*** 25.32 (7)*** 11.40 (7) 27.56 (8)*** 10.98 (7) 8.82 (6) 4.20 (6) 16.24 (7)** 10.78 (8) 14.46 (7)** 7.39 (7) 13.60 (8)* 
Wald Test 3(df) 16.60 (6)** 8.61 (6) 9.51 (6) 11.18 (6)* 18.99 (7)*** 25.32 (7)*** 11.40 (7) 8.06 (7) 6.97 (6) 8.82 (6) 4.20 (6) 9.68 (6) 10.72 (7) 14.46 (7)** 7.39 (7) 12.56 (7)* 
Sargan Test (df) - - 66.71 (50)* 131.10 (119) - - 58.90 (60) 152.20 (149) - - 62.93 (50) 121.40 (129) - - 60.30 (60) 112.70 (139) 
No. of Obs 1412 1157 1157 1412 1807 1384 1384 1807 889 711 711 889 597 468 468 597 
No. of Firms 255 255 255 255 423 423 423 423 178 178 178 178 129 129 129 129 
 
, 0 1 , 1 , , ,
1
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¦  
See Table 3 and Section 3 for the definition of the variables. Firms with less than three year consecutive observations are excluded. Model-1 gives the OLS estimates in levels. Model-2 gives OLS estimates in the first difference. Model-3 gives GMM estimates in the first difference. Model-4 gives system GMM estimates. The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Six test statistics are reported. AR(1) and AR(2) are first and second order autocorrelation of residual, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Wald Test 1 tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients; asymmptotically distributed as 2(df) under the null of no 
relationship. Wald test 2 and 3 test the joint significance of time and dummies. Sargan Test is the test of over identifying restrictions, asymptotically as 2(df) under null of instruments’ validity. Time dummies are included in all models. Industry dummies are included only in model (1). 
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Table 6: Pooled time series and cross sectional analysis of firm- and country-specific determinants across all sample countries: 1993 - 2001. 
 
Panel A : Alternative models that include firm-specific and market-wide determinants Panel B : Alternative models that include firm-specific and legal and governance determinants Equation 
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-5 Model-6 Model-7 Model-8 Model-9 Model-10 Model-11 
Constant -0.3099 *** -0.1879 *** 0.0228  -0.0739  -0.4249 *** -0.0710  -0.2630 *** 0.1378 * -0.8488 *** 0.3888 *** -0.9190 *** 
t-statistics (-3.5600)  (-2.6600)  (0.3010)  (-0.8780)  (-6.2400)  (-0.9650)  (-3.4800)  (1.7500)  (-7.3400)  (4.5000)  (-9.8300)  
LEV 0.1731 *** 0.0915 *** 0.0536 * 0.0364  0.0839 *** 0.0354  0.1290 *** 0.0480  0.1320 *** 0.0634 ** 0.1000 *** 
t-statistics (6.1600)  (3.2300)  (1.7800)  (1.1800)  (2.9200)  (1.1600)  (4.4900)  (1.6200)  (4.3000)  (2.1900)  (3.4700)  
SIZE 0.0571 *** 0.0456 *** 0.0296 *** 0.0326 *** 0.0371 *** 0.0323 *** 0.0556 *** 0.0277 *** 0.0551 *** 0.0302 *** 0.0501 *** 
t-statistics (9.6900)  (10.2000)  (6.8700)  (7.1400)  (8.7400)  (7.4200)  (10.6000)  (6.5400)  (9.1200)  (7.2600)  (10.4000)  
GROW -0.0006  -0.0010  -0.0011  -0.0018  0.0000  -0.0018  -0.0015  -0.0005  -0.0023 * -0.0002  -0.0016  
t-statistics (-0.5120)  (-0.8800)  (-0.9550)  (-1.4400)  (-0.0380)  (-1.4400)  (-1.2100)  (-0.5000)  (-1.7100)  (-0.1640)  (-1.2400)  
VOL -0.0008 ** -0.0009 ** -0.0008 ** -0.0008 ** -0.0009 ** -0.0008 ** -0.0009 * -0.0009 ** -0.0007 * -0.0009 ** -0.0009 * 
t-statistics (-1.9600)  (-1.9900)  (-2.2800)  (-2.0800)  (-2.3700)  (-2.0800)  (-1.7700)  (-2.4000)  (-1.6600)  (-2.4200)  (-1.8300)  
LIQ 0.0222 *** 0.0207 *** 0.0204 *** 0.0219 *** 0.0179 *** 0.0218 *** 0.0234 *** 0.0184 *** 0.0263 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0226 *** 
t-statistics (3.9200)  (3.8500)  (3.7200)  (3.8500)  (3.3200)  (3.8700)  (4.1300)  (3.4800)  (4.2900)  (3.3800)  (4.0500)  
PROF 00358  0.0414  0.0576 * 0.0811 ** 0.0146  0.0800 ** 0.0629 * 0.0328  0.1052 *** 0.0162  0.0620 * 
t-statistics (1.1000)  (1.3200)  (1.8200)  (2.2800)  (0.5150)  (2.3100)  (1.8200)  (1.1300)  (2.6900)  (0.5800)  (1.8300)  
SPP 0.0097 ** 0.0156 *** 0.0184 *** 0.0218 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0148 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0178 *** 0.0153 *** 0.0167 *** 
t-statistics (1.9900)  (3.1200)  (3.6200)  (3.7200)  (3.5400)  (4.2400)  (2.9600)  (3.4800)  (3.4400)  (3.0600)  (3.2900)  
AMAT 0.2137 *** 0.1719 *** 0.1311 *** 0.1244 *** 0.1667 *** 0.1243 *** 0.1913 *** 0.1345 *** 0.1784 *** 0.1476 *** 0.1752 *** 
t-statistics (6.6800)  (5.2000)  (3.7000)  (3.5100)  (4.9200)  (3.5100)  (5.8600)  (3.8100)  (5.2500)  (4.2700)  (5.3000)  
QUA 0.0004  -0.0016  -0.0027 ** -0.0044 ** 0.0003  -0.0044 *** -0.0020 * -0.0015  -0.0039 *** -0.0004  -0.0026 ** 
t-statistics (0.5700)  (-1.5700)  (-2.1600)  (-2.5500)  (0.3350)  (-2.6500)  (-1.8400)  (-1.5300)  (-2.6100)  (-0.5260)  (-2.0700)  
THDUM -0.5041 ***                     
t-statistics (-17.9000)                      
MLDUM -0.3504 ***                     
t-statistics (-14.9000)                      
SPDUM -0.2218 ***                     
t-statistics (-8.4000)                      
EDEV   -0.2446 ***                   
t-statistics   (-14.7000)                    
BKDEV     -0.0232 ***                 
t-statistics     (-5.1600)                  
MKDEV       0.0008                
t-statistics       (0.1650)                
TERM         -0.0241 ***             
t-statistics         (-14.5000)              
INF           0.0009            
t-statistics           (0.8430)            
CORR             -0.0561 ***         
t-statistics             (-15.0000)          
CRR               -0.0718 ***       
t-statistics               (-8.0300)        
SHR                 0.1149 ***     
t-statistics                 (10.6000)      
OWN                   -1.1820 ***   
t-statistics                   (-12.0000)    
AUD                     0.7215 *** 
t-statistics                     (13.7000)  
R2 0.2760  0.2273  0.1559  0.1403  0.2147  0.1403  0.2420  0.1720  0.1981  0.1978  0.2228  
Adj. R2 0.2723  0.2237  0.1520  0.1362  0.2110  0.1363  0.2385  0.1681  0.1943  0.1941  0.2192  
No. of Obs. 6192  6192  6192  6192  6192  6192  6192  6192  6192  6192  6192  
, 0 , , , , ,
1 1
(1)
N N
i t k k i t m m j t t i t
k m
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   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   ¦ ¦  
Country-specific determinants replace country dummies one at a time. The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Industry and time dummies were included in the model in order to control for industry and time effects but no 
statistically significant effect was found. See Table 1 and 3 and Section 3 for the definition of the variables. 
*, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Pooled time series and cross sectional analysis of firm-specific and market-wide determinants by country groupings : 1993 - 2001. 
 
Alternative models that include firm-specific and market-wide determinants 
Panel A : Countries Least Affected by the Crisis Panel B : Countries Most Affected by the Crisis  
Equation 
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
Constant -0.2041 * -0.2283 ** -0.6081 *** -0.4095 *** -1.0499 *** -0.8244 *** -0.3194 *** -0.3484 *** 
t-statistics (-1.8300)  (-2.0500)  (-5.7900)  (-3.4900)  (-5.8300)  (-5.3500)  (-2.8900)  (-3.1200)  
LEV 0.2687 *** 0.2476 *** 0.2355 *** 0.1681 *** 0.1353 *** 0.1686 *** 0.1231 *** 0.1154 *** 
t-statistics (5.1900)  (4.7800)  (4.5700)  (3.0100)  (4.1300)  (5.0600)  (3.7500)  (3.5200)  
SIZE 0.0541 *** 0.0560 *** 0.0576 *** 0.0641 *** 0.0457 *** 0.0513 *** 0.0401 *** 0.0388 *** 
t-statistics (7.5100)  (7.8200)  (8.1000)  (8.1700)  (7.5700)  (7.3600)  (7.5000)  (7.4200)  
GROW -00003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0013  0.0112 * 0.0080  0.0090  0.0086  
t-statistics (-0.2760)  (-0.3440)  (-0.3630)  (-1.0900)  (1.8700)  (1.4900)  (1.5100)  (1.4500)  
VOL -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0008  -0.0006  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0006  
t-statistics (-1.1400)  (-1.0800)  (-1.0900)  (-1.1400)  (-1.0300)  (-1.0900)  (-0.8420)  (-1.0300)  
LIQ 0.0181 ** 0.0181 ** 0.0177 ** 0.0213 *** 0.0259 *** 0.0285 *** 0.0251 *** 0.0248 *** 
t-statistics (2.4800)  (2.4400)  (2.3600)  (2.6300)  (3.5900)  (3.8100)  (3.6400)  (3.6000)  
PROF -00940 *** -0.0939 *** -0.0932 *** -0.0265  0.1292 *** 0.1502 *** 0.1229 *** 0.1121 *** 
t-statistics (-2.8300)  (-2.8900)  (-2.8100)  (-0.6590)  (4.4400)  (5.0000)  (4.1900)  (3.8700)  
SPP 0.0355 *** 0.0508 *** 0.0330 *** 0.0471 *** 0.0083  -0.0131 ** -0.0028  0.0035  
t-statistics (3.2800)  (4.5400)  (3.0300)  (4.0200)  (1.5700)  (-2.1100)  (-0.4820)  (0.6470)  
AMAT 0.1946 *** 0.1915 *** 0.1936 *** 0.1542 *** 0.1961 *** 0.2137 *** 0.1828 *** 0.1818 *** 
t-statistics (3.7800)  (3.7200)  (3.7400)  (2.6900)  (4.9900)  (5.4800)  (4.6200)  (4.5800)  
QUA 0.0023  0.0019  0.0020  -0.0041 ** -0.0012  -0.0015 * -0.0013  -0.0013  
t-statistics (1.4900)  (1.2300)  (1.3100)  (-2.2500)  (-1.5900)  (-1.7000)  (-1.6100)  (-1.6200)  
BKDEV -0.0375 ***       0.1188 ***       
t-statistics (-9.3900)        (5.3500)        
MKDEV   -0.0562 ***       0.0402 ***     
t-statistics   (-9.0800)        (6.4000)      
TERM     -0.0203 ***       0.0346 ***   
t-statistics     (-8.8200)        (4.4300)    
INF       -0.0008        -0.0115 *** 
t-statistics       (-0.5240)        (-2.9400)  
R2 0.3334  0.3257  0.3255  0.2534  0.1540  0.1692  0.1466  0.1433  
Adj. R2 0.3235  0.3157  0.3154  0.2422  0.1481  0.1634  0.1407  0.1374  
No. of Obs. 1973  1973  1973  1973  4219  4219  4219  4219  
, 0 , , , , ,
1 1
(1)
N N
i t k k i t m m j t t i t
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Market-wide determinants replace country dummies one at a time. The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Industry and time dummies 
were included in the model in order to control for industry and time effects but no statistically significant effect was found. See Table 1 and 3 and Section 3 for the definition of the 
variables.   
*, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Pooled time series and cross sectional analysis of firm-specific and market-wide determinants by country groupings: pre- and post-crisis. 
 
Alternative models that include firm-specific and market-wide determinants 
Panel A : Countries Least Affected by the Crisis Panel B : Countries Most Affected by the Crisis 
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
Equation 
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Constant -0.4345*** -0.0966 -0.4547*** -0.1290 -0.7568*** -0.4629*** -0.5652*** -0.3940*** -1.2788*** -1.2677*** -0.5882*** -0.7615*** -0.2793* -0.3414*** -0.3184** -0.7332*** 
t-statistics (-2.8500) (-0.7670) (-3.0200) (-1.0300) (-5.3600) (-3.9700) (-3.7200) (-3.1400) (-3.3300) (-6.5100) (-3.0300) (-6.7200) (-1.8900) (-4.2800) (-2.0600) (-6.6700) 
LEV 0.5412*** 0.1854*** 0.5371*** 0.1763*** 0.5381*** 0.1756*** 0.5390*** 0.0832 0.2083*** 0.1274*** 0.2212*** 0.1510*** 0.1610** 0.1108*** 0.2109*** 0.1258*** 
t-statistics (4.6400) (3.1400) (4.6100) (2.9900) (4.6100) (2.9800) (4.7200) (1.3600) (2.9100) (3.5300) (3.0200) (4.1400) (2.3500) (3.1100) (3.0400) (3.5500) 
Wald Test  <36.2574>***  <37.3417>***  <37.9178>***  <55.4039>***  <5.0125>**  <3.7031>*  <1.9866>  <5.7682>** 
SIZE 0.0701*** 0.0536*** 0.0706*** 0.0538*** 0.0711*** 0.0540*** 0.0734*** 0.0617*** 0.0410*** 0.0499*** 0.0421*** 0.0566*** 0.0394*** 0.0416*** 0.0429*** 0.0453*** 
t-statistics (6.4800) (6.3600) (6.5700) (6.3900) (6.5800) (6.4200) (6.4600) (7.1500) (4.1600) (8.3000) (4.1100) (8.2400) (4.1600) (7.7900) (4.2000) (8.0700) 
Wald Test  <3.8473>**  <3.9926>**  <4.1347>**  <1.8458>  <2.2036>  <4.4591>**  <0.1724>  <0.1959> 
GROW -0.0017** -0.0002 -0.0017** -0.0002 -0.0017** -0.0002 -0.0023** -0.0014 0.0060 0.0069 0.0057 0.0057 0.0051 0.0069 0.0049 0.0080 
t-statistics (-2.2400) (-0.1220) (-2.2300) (-0.1120) (-2.2300) (-0.1030) (-2.5300) (-0.7220) (0.8770) (0.8780) (0.8140) (0.7390) (0.6750) (0.8570) (0.6880) (0.9900) 
Wald Test  <0.7607>  <0.7872>  <0.8188>  <0.2072>  <0.7717>  <0.5463>  <0.7341>  <0.9808> 
VOL 0.0010 -0.0016*** 0.0010 -0.0015*** 0.0010 -0.0015*** 0.0008 -0.0019*** 0.0005 -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0009 
t-statistics (1.4200) (-2.6900) (1.4000) (-2.6800) (1.4700) (-2.6700) (1.0800) (-3.1000) (0.4660) (-0.9910) (0.5380) (-0.9930) (0.7330) (-0.9130) (0.7320) (-0.9080) 
Wald Test  <7.2333>***  <7.1867>***  <7.1300>***  <9.6005>***  <0.9816>  <0.9853>  <0.8330>  <0.8242> 
LIQ 0.0099 0.0277*** 0.0102 0.0282*** 0.0100 0.0273*** 0.0122 0.0298*** 0.0187 0.0264*** 0.0197 0.0280*** 0.0166 0.0252*** 0.0193 0.0252*** 
t-statistics (1.2400) (3.8700) (1.2600) (3.9700) (1.2500) (3.8600) (1.4500) (3.9000) (1.1400) (3.8300) (1.1900) (3.9800) (1.0500) (3.8200) (1.1900) (3.8500) 
Wald Test  <14.9628>***  <15.7635>***  <14.9081>***  <15.1951>***  <14.6693>***  <15.8793>***  <14.6250>***  <14.8423>*** 
PROF -0.1575*** -0.0738 -0.1538*** -0.0812 -0.1556*** -0.0806 -0.1175*** 0.0136 -0.1986 0.1403*** -0.1764 0.1581*** -0.2506 0.1388*** -0.1895 0.1439*** 
t-statistics (-5.3000) (-0.9150) (-5.0400) (-1.0100) (-5.0700) (-0.9980) (-2.8000) (0.1560) (-1.2800) (3.8400) (-1.1300) (4.1700) (-1.5900) (3.7900) (-1.2200) (4.0000) 
Wald Test  <1.0787>  <0.8194>  <0.8659>  <2.2749>  <14.7733>***  <17.4249>***  <14.3704>***  <16.0084>*** 
SPP 0.0639* 0.0157 0.0739* 0.0321** 0.0666* 0.0141 0.0703* 0.0112 0.0438** 0.0006 0.0342* -0.0100 0.0687*** -0.0123 0.0546*** 0.0041 
t-statistics (1.6800) (1.2000) (1.9200) (2.3900) (1.7400) (1.0700) (1.8300) (0.7830) (2.2000) (0.0852) (1.6700) (-1.2900) (3.4400) (-1.4100) (2.9000) (0.5330) 
Wald Test  <13.5884>***  <9.6664>***  <15.8179>***  <17.2043>***  <34.0127>***  <32.4277>***  <86.4760>***  <43.5409>*** 
AMAT 0.1117 0.2433*** 0.1102 0.2422*** 0.1120 0.2465*** 0.0859 0.2078*** 0.2166*** 0.1953*** 0.2222*** 0.2074*** 0.2055*** 0.1755*** 0.2204*** 0.1869*** 
t-statistics (1.3100) (4.0200) (1.2900) (3.9900) (1.3000) (4.0500) (0.9410) (3.2800) (3.2800) (4.8700) (3.3500) (5.2100) (3.1700) (4.2900) (3.3800) (4.6400) 
Wald Test  <16.1455>***  <15.9151>***  <16.4239>***  <10.7776>***  <0.2811>  <0.1390>  <0.5362>  <0.6937> 
QUA 0.0027 0.0017 0.0024 0.0012 0.0024 0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0031* -0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0019 
t-statistics (1.1200) (0.9890) (0.9400) (0.7300) (0.9610) (1.0200) (-0.7040) (-1.7000) (-0.6400) (-0.9090) (-0.6650) (-0.9620) (-0.6270) (-0.9960) (-0.6670) (-0.8340) 
Wald Test  <0.9789>  <0.5327>  <1.0477>  <28.8767>*  <0.8268>  <0.9260>  <0.9921>  <0.6949> 
BKDEV -0.0431*** -0.0352***       0.1858*** 0.1178***       
t-statistics (-5.9300) (-8.8100)       (2.7900) (5.2100)       
Wald Test  <3.3674>*        <9.0569>***       
MKDEV   -0.0498*** -0.0576***       0.0250*** 0.0478***     
t-statistics   (-5.4800) (-8.2500)       (2.7500) (6.2700)     
Wald Test    <1.2744>        <8.9428>***     
TERM     -0.0159*** -0.0240***       0.0429*** 0.0230**   
t-statistics     (-5.5600) (-8.1200)       (3.0700) (2.2600)   
Wald Test      <7.5096>***        <3.8724>**   
INF       -0.0034** 0.0410***       -0.0354*** 0.0543*** 
t-statistics       (-2.2100) (5.0100)       (-3.8500) (5.2300) 
Wald Test        <29.4336>***        <74.4934>*** 
R2 0.3671 0.3364 0.3600 0.3318 0.3615 0.3370 0.3051 0.2714 0.1562 0.1756 0.1575 0.1888 0.1539 0.1615 0.1634 0.1727 
Adj. R2 0.3368 0.3232 0.3294 0.3185 0.3309 0.3238 0.2719 0.2569 0.1350 0.1683 0.1364 0.1815 0.1327 0.1540 0.1424 0.1653 
No. of Obs. 527 1232 527 1232 527 1232 527 1232 983 2712 983 2712 983 2712 983 2712 
, 0 , , , , ,
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Market-wide determinants replace country dummies one at a time. The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Industry and time dummies were included in the model in order to control for industry and time effects but no statistically significant effect was found. See Table 1 and 3 and 
Section 3 for the definition of the variables. Wald test (chi-square distributed with 1 degree of freedom) is used to find whether the different of the coefficients between pre-crisis and post-crisis are statistically significant or not.   
*, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix A: The structure of panel data 
 
The panel data are constructed as followed. The sample includes all non-financial firms traded in the national stock exchanges for the period 
1993 to 2001. Firms with missing observations during the sample period are excluded. The panel data set is unbalanced as there are more 
observations for some firms than for others. In dynamic modelling, we also exclude firms with less than three consecutive observations. The 
total numbers of observations are 1,726 for Thai firms; 2,493 for Malaysian firms; 1,164 for Singaporean firms and 809 for Australian firms. 
 
(a) Number of firms having n continuous observations  (b) Number of observations in each year 
n (years) Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia  Years Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia 
 
1 
 
2 
 
53 28 12 
 
1993 0 12 0 51 
 
2 
 
8 
 
63 24 20 
 
1994 135 57 80 55 
 
3 
 
8 
 
96 32 31 
 
1995 173 173 99 55 
 
4 
 
31 77 26 33 
 
1996 208 225 123 64 
 
5 
 
32 73 11 16 
 
1997 229 295 132 82 
 
6 
 
40 57 30 8 
 
1998 251 345 146 104 
 
7 
 
40 90 16 8 
 
1999 247 424 174 126 
 
8 
 
104 31 64 4 
 
2000 246 465 192 134 
 
9 
 
0 7 0 32 
 
2001 237 497 218 138 
 
Total 
 
265 547 231 164 
 
Total 1726 2493 1164 809 
 
 
          
(c) Number of firms in each industry group  (d) Number of observations in each industry group 
Industry Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia  Industry Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia 
 
1 18 41 9 4  1 115 208 42 33 
 
2 30 146 27 13  2 183 675 117 56 
 
3 11 31 35 3  3 71 135 153 7 
 
4 5 38 42 6  4 29 144 230 33 
 
5 28 28 23 26  5 163 138 130 98 
 
6 43 64 9 11  6 296 323 59 48 
 
7 48 32 12 3  7 347 123 56 17 
 
8 7 8 13 8  8 40 36 37 27 
 
9 10 29 5 43  9 61 138 20 255 
 
10 8 16 4 9  10 50 62 16 29 
 
11 18 47 18 7  11 110 194 103 38 
 
12 39 67 34 31  12 261 317 201 168 
 
Total 265 547 231 164  Total 1726 2493 1164 809 
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